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Abstract 
Following the victory of the Kurdish party DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, Democratic 
Society Party) in Turkey’s southeastern provinces in the local elections of March 2009, 
Turkey witnessed the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Development Party) 
government’s Kurdish initiative, the closure of the victorious Kurdish party, and waves of 
arrests of Kurdish activists and politicians. This rush of action constituted a renewed effort to 
contain and roll back the political and societal influence of the Kurdish movement. But what 
is it exactly that the government and the state were attempting to contain, and why? This 
article considers the recent moves of the ruling AKP, the judiciary, and the Turkish Armed 
Forces in regard to the “Kurdish problem” in Turkey’s Southeast, interpreting them as 
different responses to the regional success of the Kurdish movement. 
 
 
Introduction 
The Kurdish question is one of the most long-standing issues in Turkey’s politics. In the early 
2000s, with the Turkey-EU accession negotiations ahead, the  ceasefire of the PKK (Partiya 
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Karkerên Kurdistan, Kurdistan Workers’ Party), and the coming to power of the AKP (Adalet 
ve Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Development Party), a range of political reforms were 
introduced, which allowed a more peaceful atmosphere to prevail in the Kurdish-inhabited 
provinces of Turkey’s Southeast. These developments, as well as the Kurdish party’s success 
in the municipal elections in the region, allowed for a re-orientation in the political 
organization of the Kurdish movement over the past decade. Indeed, while no longer in 
control of the region by means of arms, the Kurdish movement, with the PKK being the 
principal actor, has reinforced its presence. This article discusses these new realities through 
the prism of the developments following the elections of March 2009. These developments, so 
we will argue, testify to different attempts of government and state institutions to contain and 
roll back this political and societal influence of the PKK in the southeastern, predominantly 
Kurdish-inhabited provinces. We will argue that, alarmed by the election outcome, the ruling 
party (AKP) and state officials responded in two ways. The first was to launch the Kurdish 
initiative, challenging the PKK and its affiliated organizations as well as the DTP 
(Demokratik Toplum Partisi, Democratic Society Party) both politically and ideologically; the 
second was the upsurge in judicial investigations and arrests of activists deemed to be PKK 
members, in order to crack down on its urban wings. The elections and government-initiated 
constitutional reforms, as well as the waves of arrest will be discussed in the context of the 
ways of dealing with the Kurdish issue.  
 Towards the end of its second term in power, the AKP embarked on a major new 
round of constitutional changes seemingly aimed at a reform of the Turkish political system in 
2010. This effort, however, did not win the backing of the main Kurdish party, the BDP 
(Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, Peace and Democracy Party), even though the changes had been 
prompted, at least in part, by the controversial court ban on the BDP’s predecessor, the DTP, 
earlier that year. This ruling appeared to undermine an attempt of the government to deal with 
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the Kurdish problem; yet, a key element of the government’s proposed reforms, an 
amendment to limit the ability of the courts to ban political parties, was rejected in 
parliament.1 Secularists rejected constitutional reforms, considering them an attack on the 
judiciary, one of the bastions of Turkish nationalist secular republicanism (Kemalism), and 
believed that the executive (the AKP government) was seeking to gain control over the courts 
as part of its unstated (“hidden”) agenda of Islamification.2 This struggle for the state and the 
balance of power between its different institutions was of less relevance to the BDP, which 
rejected the proposed changes because it conceived of them as lacking concessions and 
changes to its aims.  
 The recent moves from Ankara in respect to the Southeast have been played out 
against the background of the central power-play in Turkey today. The ongoing battle 
between the defenders of Kemalist and Islamist ideas has been expressed in the struggle for a 
definition of the state’s Kurdish policy: the established hard-line approach of judiciary 
repression and security clampdown versus a new attempt at political reform from the AKP 
government. Both, however, should be placed within the context of the contemporary entry of 
the Kurdish movement into political society. It is the breakthrough of electoral success and 
the attempts by the legal BDP and the outlawed PKK—historically the leading organization of 
the Kurdish movement—to develop structures for self-government at local and regional levels 
that have defined state and government responses. 
 Thus, while recent developments related to Turkey’s Kurdish issue can be represented 
as a bivalent political play of regional (Kurdish) versus state (Turkish) interests, they can also 
be placed in a triangular nexus of relations between three sets of actors: those of the 
traditional statist institutions (primarily the Turkish Armed Forces and judiciary, ideologically 
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2
 For an analysis of the planned changes and reactions to them, see Aslı Ü. Bali, ‘Unpacking Turkey’s “Court-
Packing” Referendum,’ in Middle East Report Online, November 5, 2010. 
4 
 
represented as “Kemalists”), the AKP government (and more widely the parliamentary party, 
the party as a whole and the “Islamist” movement that it represents), and the “pro-Kurdish” 
organizations (including the PKK and the legal BDP, referred to as “the Kurdish 
movement”).3 In other words, state forces, differently represented by Kemalists and by 
government institutions, have used alternative approaches for different reasons in seeking to 
deny the growing power of the Kurdish movement. This attempt, which is still ongoing, 
reached a climax during the period between 2009 and 2010.  
 A brief listing of key events that form the backdrop to this paper can be taken from the 
nation-wide municipal elections on 29 March 2009, in which the DTP won the Southeast back 
from the AKP (earlier Kurdish electoral progress in the region from the mid-1990s had been 
reversed during the first half of the 2000s, with the AKP’s ascendency). Then, in April 2009, 
some fifty persons (mainly DTP officials, including three vice-presidents of the party) were 
detained during a wave of police operations all over the Southeast (and also in Ankara and 
Istanbul).4 Next, in May 2009, President Abdullah Gül made a public statement, naming the 
Kurdish issue as the most pressing problem in the country, followed by Prime Minister 
Tayyip Erdoğan’s announcement of a new initiative, a “Kurdish opening” (Kürt açılımı). In 
mid-August 2009, Erdoğan made an emotional appeal for all parties to unite behind a solution 
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to the Kurdish question, rhetorically asking parliamentarians: “If Turkey had not spent its 
energy, budget, peace and young people on [fighting] terrorism, if Turkey had not spent the 
last 25 years in conflict, where would we be today?”5  
 This AKP attempt to deal with the Kurdish issue faced harsh criticism from opposition 
parties, especially in August 2009, after deadly attacks of the PKK, and at the end of October, 
with the return of PKK fighters and families that appeared to the Turkish mainstream as stage-
managed by the DTP as a PKK-victory parade.6 Thus, in the fall of 2009 the AKP retreated. 
The PKK return initiative was quickly halted, and the Kurdish opening rephrased as a project 
of national unity, subsumed under a wider “democratic” initiative aimed to include 
recognition of (some) other minorities and minority rights within the traditionally non-
pluralist Turkish state system (and extended also to a normalization and improvement of 
relations with the country’s eastern neighbors). Nevertheless, the government had made it 
clear that it was searching for a new way of defining the Kurdish issue .7  
 However, even as it attempted to initiate this break with traditional statist ideology—
and in the midst of apparent competition, rather than cooperation with the Kurdish 
movement—the AKP was unable to control the official narrative. Government ministers 
instead found themselves having to respond to new moves from the security forces and 
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judiciary. On 11 December 2009, the Constitutional Court banned the DTP (a rather sudden, 
not to say timely conclusion to a long-standing case), and on 24 December, the Diyarbakır 
Chief Prosecutor’s Office began another operation, which resulted in the arrest of some eighty 
persons, mainly party officials and representatives of the newly-formed BDP, including nine 
present or former Kurdish party mayors.8 A few weeks later, in mid-February 2010, came yet 
another round of arrests, with dozens of (now) BDP executive members taken into custody. 
According to the indictments, the detainees of the April, December, and February operations 
were all members of the Turkey Council of the KCK (Koma Civaken Kurdistan, Kurdish 
Communities Union), an organization linked to the PKK. The people arrested were thought to 
be running municipalities under the direction of the PKK.9 
 The main thesis of this article is that these developments testify to different attempts to 
contain and roll back the political and societal influence of the Kurdish movement led by the 
PKK. With mounting concerns finally triggered by the 2009 election outcome, the ruling 
party and state officials responded with (1) the legal-security attempt to muzzle the Kurdish 
movement at the organizational level, by banning the political party and through the upsurge 
in judicial investigations into and arrests of activists deemed to be (surrogate) PKK members, 
in order to crack down on its urban wings (in combination with continuing military pressure 
on the PKK based in Iraqi Kurdish territory); and (2) the government’s launch of the Kurdish 
initiative, challenging the Kurdish movement both politically and ideologically (and 
attempting to restructure the relationship of the Turkish state to the Southeast and its Kurdish 
issue).  
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 This paper will discuss the responses and some of the effects that they have generated, 
as well as consider future prospects for the Kurdish issue in Turkey. First, however, attention 
will be devoted to understanding the events following the March 2009 local elections, and 
what it exactly is that the different responses intended to confront. To this end, we begin by 
elaborating on these elections, which were key to the current developments. Then we lay out 
some of the main characteristics of the political institutionalization of the PKK in the 
Southeast of Turkey, and the role of the KCK. Following that, we discuss the AKP 
government’s responses to this ongoing institutionalization process and turn to the ways in 
which this has been received by the PKK, the DTP/BDP, and their followers, before 
concluding with a consideration of future prospects.  
 
The 2009 Local Elections and the Kurds 
The March 2009 local elections resulted in a clear victory for the DTP. This is important to 
emphasize, because its significance can easily be missed. The DTP’s success is not easily 
detected unless one looks closely: country-wide, the party was essentially static, stuck at an 
unimpressive five to six percent of the national vote.10 In order to observe the DTP’s success 
attention needs to be directed to the DTP’s performance itself, because this is what defines 
Turkey’s Kurdish region today—and would, indeed, serve as the most likely roadmap for any 
future regional devolution of power, a common aspiration among the Kurdish movement. 
 Building on its success in the 2007 national election, when it was able to send 21 MPs 
to parliament,11 the DTP achieved an enormous increase in its control of local governments in 
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2009 as compared to the previous local elections in 2004. In terms of total (city and district) 
mayorships, for example, it made a relative gain of over 60 percent, nearly doubling its 2004 
vote in several provinces,12 and winning back support that had previously gone over to the 
AKP. Diyarbakır, the only metropolitan city in the southeastern region, had been publicly 
targeted by the AKP during the election campaign, with Prime Minister Erdoğan vowing to 
take the city and the DTP mayor responding by claiming that it was their “fortress.” In the 
end, Diyarbakır not only stayed with the DTP, but did emphatically so.  
 And yet, crucial as it was, the election in Diyarbakır was little different from others in 
the area. Basically, third parties were squeezed out of the track in a two-horse race. Rival 
claims were made by the two principal protagonists in what became a referendum to 
determine who represented the people’s “real” interests, with the AKP stressing practical 
economics and conservative (Islamic) values, and the DTP emphasizing a regionally 
politicized ethno-nationalist (Kurdish) identity. And it was the DTP which won the popular 
vote across nearly the whole of Turkey’s southeastern corner. Equally noteworthy, therefore, 
is the depth as well as breadth of DTP support in the provincial assemblies (İl Genel 
Meclisleri) vote: in very high turnouts (70-85 percent), the DTP polled almost half of all votes 
cast in the ten provinces that it won, ending up with four of the top five percentage votes in 
the entire country.13  
 
The Kurdish area in Turkey: Provincial authorities after the 2009 local election results14 
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Table: Percentage vote by province (including change of vote share from 2004 and 
margin of victory) * 
 
PROVINCE 
DTP AKP Victory 
Margin*** Vote Change** Vote Change 
Hakkari 74 +28 21    -12 54 
Şırnak 61 +23 31     +6 30 
Diyarbakır 59 +16 32 -1 28 
Batman 53  +3 35      +18 18 
Van 48 +22 34 -6 14 
Mardin 44 +17 27        +4 17 
Muş 43 +13 29 -3 14 
Ağrı 37 not given 29 -6  8 
Siirt 37 +11 35 -3  2 
Iğdır 32 not given 23 -1 10 
TOTAL****    48%    (+17)   29% - 1   19% 
Bitlis 27 +12 32 +3  5 
Tunceli 20  +2 27      +10  7 
Kars 18 not given 37 -2 19 
Şanlıurfa 20 not given 40  0 20 
Bingöl     21*****  0 43  0 22 
 
*  Selection criteria: provinces in which the DTP recorded >15% of the vote. 
**  DTP figures calculated on proviso that it entered the 2004 as the major partner of a six-party 
coalition. 
***  Some victory margin figures appear inconsistent as an effect of rounding up or down. 
**** Averages for DTP-won provinces.  
***** In Bingöl, the DTP came in third fractionally (0.1%) behind the Islamic Felicity Party (Saadet 
Partisi).  
 
Placing this within the national context, Ali Çarkoğlu noted that “the DTP emerged as the 
most successful party in attracting […] votes at the expense of the AKP at the provincial 
level.” He suggests that in the first electoral setback for the AKP, after a decade of ever-
increasing success at the polls, it was the gains of the Kurdish movement that were of more 
immediate concern than those of the principal national opposition, the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi, Republican People’s Party). Significantly, Çarkoğlu analyzes the dynamic in the 
Southeast thus: “The reason for the declining support of the AKP was most likely the ethnic 
identity issues […] The military operations that followed the AKP’s electoral success in the 
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region in the July 2007 elections [incursions into Iraq, mostly against the PKK mountain 
bases] appear to have tilted the electoral balance in favor of the DTP.”15 In other words, it 
would seem that, when people were forced to choose between the AKP and the PKK, they 
went for the latter, expressed at the ballot box through support for the DTP. 
  
Local Institutionalization of the Kurdish Movement 
Large parts of the Southeast have been under the ideological influence of the PKK since the 
end of the 1980s—and for part of that time it was even controlled by its guerillas.16 
Participation in the political process since 1990 has provided the Kurdish movement with a 
legitimate structure and recognized basis for public gathering, legal protection from 
prosecution, new access to domestic and international audiences, and new means to engage in 
symbolic politics (such as the Kurdification of place names, and the establishment of Kurdish 
cultural centers).17 Yet, it was only following the municipal elections of April 1999, when 
HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, People’s Democracy Party) won six provinces in the 
region and obtained 37 mayor seats, that the movement became politically institutionalized at 
the local level. This process of institutionalization has contained two aspects: on the one hand, 
the process of developing legal political organizations expressing Kurdish demands and 
interests; on the other hand, the development of these demands into parts of the (local) state 
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apparatus. Although ethnic Kurds had long been represented in Turkey’s political system, it 
was only now that they were able to assert Kurdish claims.18 
From 1990 to present, successive Kurdish political parties close to the PKK (the HEP, 
DEP, HADEP, DEHAP, DTP, and now the BDP, each founded as its predecessor was closed 
by the state) have steadily increased their power and confidence. The formation of the HEP 
(Halkın Emek Partisi, People’s Work Party) in 1990 and the election of its candidates in 
October 1991 provided the Kurdish movement with an institutional basis for collective and 
public gathering that it had lacked, allowing it to open offices in cities and towns around the 
country, and thus enabling it to rally increasing numbers of Kurdish supporters.19 With the 
DEP (Demokrasi Partisi, Democracy Party) in 1993, the HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, 
People’s Democracy Party) in 1994, and the DEHAP (Demokratik Halk Partisi, Democratic 
People’s Party) in 1997, it gained recognition and support in the European Union in the 
context of human rights, as well as establishing itself in local elective bodies and gaining 
some success nationally. With the DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, Democratic Society 
Party, established in 2005), it managed to become the third party in the national parliament in 
the 2007 election, before going on to re-establish itself as the primary party in the region in 
2009 (a position recently confirmed by the referendum on the proposed constitutional 
changes, in which the BDP’s call for a boycott was widely followed, and also reported, 
publicly confirming what had previously been little observed in the mass media).20 
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 This growing strength of legitimate, albeit continuously de-legitimized, political 
power was reinforced with the local development of a Kurdish civil society, both inspiration 
as well as human resources from the PKK. In the municipalities, strong relationships and 
cooperation have been fostered in recent years between the party officials, their 
administrations, and the DTP/BDP-friendly NGOs and local entrepreneurs, giving shape to 
tight knots of local power-sharing through which relationships with the Kurdish 
constituencies have been developed.21  
 Even though the municipalities have suffered from bureaucratic obstacles imposed 
upon them by the central state institutions since the beginning and had far more difficulty in 
attracting certain types of subsidies and investment than municipalities under the ruling AKP, 
they have nevertheless managed to develop what Watts terms local political “micro-
climates.”22 According to Watts, these micro-climates are characterized by (1) a blurring of 
the relationship between state and non-state actors (between the municipalities and the local 
professional associations, unions, NGOs, and so on), and (2) the changing nature of social 
resistance, which is becoming increasingly institutionalized through the municipality-steered 
activities. The localized socio-political networks of cooperation reinforce the power of the 
municipalities and the Kurdish movement more generally, as they enable—through the 
provision of various social services and an engagement with a diverse repertoire of symbolic 
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politics—a reaching out to the local constituents and development of ties of reciprocated 
loyalty.23 
 These regional developments over the last decade did not go unnoticed by the state 
officials or the current governing party. Already at the very beginning of the Kurdish 
movement’s re-orientation towards a primarily political struggle in the early 2000s, the 
Turkish establishment and the Turkish Armed Forces had exhibited great concern about what 
was observed as “revival and restructuring of the separatist movement through political 
means.”24 The governing AKP, meanwhile, seeking to increase its votes among the Kurds in 
the southeastern and eastern parts of the country, had been developing equally exclusive 
networks of cooperation with the local civil society actors in the municipalities under its own 
ruling (and over a similar time span). The AKP’s organizational network, of course, was able 
to enjoy state patronage, unlike that of the DTP which, engaged in contentious politics,25 was 
instead subject to state pressure. Over the course of the decade, the Turkish judiciary launched 
literally hundreds of investigations into the activities and speeches of the local Kurdish 
actors.26 Notwithstanding the constructive local political work of the AKP, however, along 
with the administrative and economic hindrance from Ankara and the downright destructive 
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force of the state’s legal-security apparatus, the Kurdish party was overwhelmingly vindicated 
by the electorate in 2009. The succession of recent events listed above unfolded in such a 
context. 
 The government’s stuttering Kurdish initiative, along with the arrests made and the 
party closure enacted during its development, together with the entire history of judiciary 
investigations and arrests, thus needs to be understood in the light of the regional 
developments described. The legitimate development of Kurdish power is considered a threat 
to the central state and its control over the Kurdish region. Ultimately, this becomes a struggle 
over sovereignty. The crack-down on the KCK—and this is supported by the government, at 
least judging by the pronouncements of its leaders27—was carried out in order to obstruct the 
continued socio-political institutionalization of the Kurdish movement in Turkey’s Southeast. 
 
The Role of the KCK  
When the PKK was established as a political party in 1978, it had the classical organizational 
structure of communist parties, with a General Secretary as the leading party official and an 
Executive Committee responsible for direct operations. Today, the organization has grown 
into a complex of parties and organizations, with the PKK as the ideological center. Founded 
in 2005 as the KKK (Koma Komalen Kurdistan), the KCK can be regarded as a political 
project, one that builds, to paraphrase Öcalan, “on the self-government of local communities 
and is organized in the form of open councils, town councils, local parliaments and larger 
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congresses.”28 As an organization within the PKK complex, the KCK is formally headed by 
Murat Karayılan, with decision-making councils composed of representatives from the 
different parts of the Kurdistan region (spread over Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran) and the 
Kurdish Diaspora in Western Europe.29 The persons arrested in spring and winter of 2009 
were accused of membership of the Turkey Council of the KCK. 
 The KCK in Turkey is active in several spheres of public life. It has a legal committee, 
which is involved in the establishment of local councils (at village, quarter, and city level), 
“people’s courts,” a committee for civil society organizations that implements projects to 
activate civil society, and a language and education committee responsible for implementing 
projects to develop the usage of Kurdish as a written language. An important concept in the 
KCK is that of the “free citizen” (özgür yurttaş). The free citizen concept includes basic civil 
liberties, such as the freedom of speech and organization, but also freedom of ethnic, 
religious, cultural, and linguistic identity, and the freedom to develop a cultural and national 
identity.30 Taking the concept of free citizen as a starting point, the KCK is considered to be 
the architect of the free municipality model (özgür belediyecilik modeli), adopted by the DTP 
at a three-day conference in February 2008; it aims to realize a bottom-up participative 
administrative body, from local to provincial levels.31 The KCK and the free municipality 
model are both to be understood in terms of the “democratic triangle” concept developed by 
Öcalan. Outlined from his island jail through his lawyers,32 this democratic triangle is 
                                                           
28
 Ahmet Akkaya and Joost Jongerden, ‘The PKK in the 2000s: Continuity through breaks?’ in Nationalisms and 
politics in Turkey: political Islam, Kemalism and the Kurdish issue, edited by Marlies Casier and Joost 
Jongerden, 143-162. New York: Routledge., 2011. 
29
 Koma Komalen Kurdistan Sözleşmesi, ‘Kongre Belgeleri Dizisi IV (Congress Papers Series IV)’, Wesanen 
Serxwebun (Serxwebun Publishers, 2005). 
30
 Koma Komalen Kurdistan Sözleşmesi, op.cit. 
31
 ‘DTP’de hedef 100 belediye. http://www.aktuelbakis.com/Politika/6656.html  
32
 Abdullah Öcalan was captured in 1998 and sentenced to death in 1999. This sentence was turned into life-long 
imprisonment following EU-induced reforms in Turkey, which required the abolition of the death penalty. 
17 
 
intended to function as a “strategic dispositive,” as institutional and ideological capability—
that is, to orient and organize Kurdish political demands (and thereby resolve the problem in 
Turkey’s Southeast). According to this ideology, the democratic triangle should be composed 
of three interrelated projects: the democratic republic, democratic autonomy, and democratic 
confederalism.33  
 The project for a democratic republic aims at the establishment of a new, reformed 
republic with equal rights for all citizens. It is in the context of this project that the drafting of 
a new constitution became a tangible political demand on the part of the Kurdish movement. 
In the constitution of the Republic of Turkey, citizenship has been equated with 
Turkishness,34 historically making Kurds invisible.35 A new constitution, it follows, has to 
define citizenship in civil terms. While the project of the democratic republic centers on 
individual rights, the project of democratic autonomy focuses on the collective rights of the 
population. Both cultural and religious rights are conceived of as forms of such collective 
rights. Finally, democratic confederalism is a project for local self-organization. Referring 
among others to Murray Bookchin, this democratic confederalism is described as an 
alternative project of democratization, one which is to be organized bottom-up, from the local 
level.36 It was this “democratic triangle” project which implied that political and ideological 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Currently, the PKK-leader lives on the prison-island of Imralı in the Sea of Marmara. He communicates through 
his lawyers who are allowed to visit him on a weekly basis.  
33
 Ahmet Hamdi Akkaya and Joost Jongerden, ‘The PKK in the 2000s: Continuity through breaks?’, in 
Nationalisms and politics in Turkey: political Islam, Kemalism and the Kurdish issue, ed. Marlies Casier and 
Joost Jongerden (London/New York: Routledge, 2011).  
34
 Article 66 of the Turkish Constitution. For a discussion see Baskın Oran and Ibrahim Kaboğlu’s minority 
report (see below). 
35
 Henry Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question (Lanham/Oxford: Rowman Littlefield 
Publishers, 1998): 10-11. Even now the number of Kurds in Turkey is disputed, primarily because the state still 
does not gather official statistics according to ethnicity (e.g., through the regular national census).  
36
 Mustafa Karasu, Radikal Demokrasi (Wesanen Mezopotamya Neuss, 2009).  
18 
 
struggles be given priority over armed conflict, developments confirmed in 2009 through one 
of the main PKK militant-activist magazines Serxwebun. 
 Fuelled, among other things, by Turkey’s desire to become a member of the European 
Union and the reform requirements attendant upon this, public discussion about individual 
and collective rights has flourished during the past decade. The drafting of a new constitution 
had become a vigorously debated issue, and the issue of cultural rights was to be a 
cornerstone of the government’s Kurdish opening, to which we will turn in the following 
sections. For the PKK, however, it is democratic confederalism that has been the key project, 
envisaging, as it does, not only a grand program for a societal configuration beyond the 
nation-state, but also a clear project for local organization. The recent waves of arrests were 
thus also aimed at preventing further implementation of these kinds of concepts and projects, 
by taking down the KCK.  
 Some analysts and sections of the press have made a direct link between the KCK 
arrests in April and December 2009 and the success of the DTP in the local elections earlier 
that year, indicating that the KCK is responsible for the latter by instilling fear in the 
population and/or oppressing the DTP into merely fulfilling its instructions.37 Aside from 
overestimating the extent of (malevolent) KCK power over the electorate (as a corollary of 
underplaying the high level of genuine support for the Kurdish cause among Kurds in the 
region), this kind of analysis tends to underestimate the independent organizational dynamics 
of the DTP/BDP, assuming an overly high level of control over the party on the part of the 
KCK. The contribution of the KCK to the development and success of the DTP is not to be 
disregarded, as indicated; the main (PKK-linked) Kurdish political party in Turkey had been 
gaining significant success before the development of the KCK, and certainly the intended 
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damage done to the KCK by the waves of arrests seems to have had little immediate impact 
on the BDP polling booth performance, judging from the referendum outcome in 2010 (in 
which the BDP consolidated its electoral support).  
 A more refined approach would enable us to observe the distinction between legal and 
illegal Kurdish parties, but without separating them from each other. We argue that the KCK 
has been instrumental in the regional development of DTP/BDP strategy, and that 
organizationally they are overlapping entities. This means that it is difficult to make the 
simple differentiation necessary in order to ascribe electoral success to one as opposed to the 
other.  
 
The Government Response: The Kurdish Opening 
Some analysts consider the AKP’s democratic initiative as dating back a decade and tied to 
Turkey’s accession process to the EU, which is reasonable, but little ingenuous.38 It can also 
be argued that what actually happened, as explained above, was that the government 
embarked on its Kurdish opening only after the DTP’s local election success, but then drew 
back and instead diluted it into a “democratic” opening. The current Kurdish initiative, 
therefore, looks more like an ad hoc process of politicking than a considered culmination of 
years of preparation. The best AKP revisionist apology was the initiative going back to a few 
comments made by Erdoğan in support of the Kurdish cause in Diyarbakır, in 2005. But the 
very fact that these were not followed up until two years later—that is, until after the DTP’s 
victory—rather disproves that argument. 
 What the Kurdish initiative was intended to achieve exactly remains unclear, leading 
to discussions over whether there actually was a clear package or plan.39 Thus, it still remains 
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far from apparent whether the government even has any explicit strategy at all, or where the 
Kurdish opening as announced fits into its policy. This fudging, in fact, gives support to the 
Kurdish nationalist claim that they determine the political discourse, with the AKP primarily 
reacting to them—which would be no shame in a genuinely pluralistic democracy able to 
embrace an internal ethno-nationalist cause, but it is not something that the AKP has appeared 
very willing or able to accept. In order to understand the government initiative without the 
luxury of a clear-cut policy document, therefore, we need to draw inferences and generalize 
from the process as it has emerged.  
 In terms of substance, what seems apparent is that measures were to be promoted 
towards (1) ending outstanding restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language (such as the 
lack of Kurdish Studies departments at universities), without allowing for it to achieve the 
status of a second official language (thus making it unacceptable as a medium for education at 
primary or secondary schools); (2) the “surrender” (return) of PKK fighters, who might be 
prosecuted or not; and (3) a revival of economic investment in the region through the 
longstanding GAP project,40 however without any review of the historical efficacy of this 
approach (or consideration of similarly scaled alternatives). In terms of style or method, there 
was an initially fertile period of consultation, in which government ministers met with several 
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business, professional, human rights, and other organizations from the region (generally 
outside the Kurdish movement); however, these efforts dried up, with the process withering 
rather than unfolding as the opening itself closed.  
 The government’s prevarication in its Kurdish opening speaks of a complex 
combination of motivations on part of the AKP. With a strong base in the Kurdish and 
Southeastern electorate, it clearly is open and sensitive to Kurdish claims and grievances. 
Also, one might suggest that the AKP is, or at least has been, a natural ally for Kurdish 
aspirations, insofar as Kurds and Islamists have both been defined as the Other of the 
Republican hegemony of Turkish secularism, as extra-state to Kemalist statism, and denied 
political space in the narrative of modernity—Kurds due to their so-called “backward” culture 
and feudalistic tribal organization, Islamists due to their assumed pre-scientific religiosity and 
pre-nationalist social organization.  
 The prime objective of the AKP government in the Kurdish part of its democratic 
initiative, therefore, may be understood as aiming to combat the PKK at the ideological level. 
This is a battle for “hearts and minds” and, indeed, for “souls.” The AKP has a “natural” 
constituency in the Southeast—as earlier elections in particular have shown41—and does not 
want to lose this to the Kurdish movement which, by its very foregrounding of ethnicity, 
denies the primacy of Islam. References from leading government figures to “our Kurdish 
brothers” (Kürt kardeşlerimiz) typifies the AKP refashioning of an old discourse to frame this 
matter—that is, invoking the religious claim to unity, but with the modern slant of a stated 
ethnicity.42  
                                                           
41
 Such as the AKP’s success in the 2002 parliamentary elections and the 2004 municipal elections, as well as 
the electoral success of the AKP’s predecessor, the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) in the Southeast in the 1990s.  
42
 The PKK, it might be noted, has also reached out to Islam in the past, with attempts to incorporate more 
religious-inspired figures into its movement and with Öcalan’s writings that sought to appease the more pious 
Kurdish constituents in face of the regional electoral competition with the AKP’s predecessor, the Refah Partisi. 
22 
 
 Notwithstanding these considerations, however, the determining realpolitik of the 
system within which the AKP operates has the ballot box as its ultimate sanction. This is 
revealed by the government’s failure to address the national electoral threshold (by lowering it 
from 10 percent to the European norm of 3-5 percent). The omission of this from the proposed 
constitutional changes thus condemns the AKP to the straight-forward charge of political self-
interest. They do not want to risk their parliamentary majority, which would be the likely 
result of the lowering of the 10-percent threshold. This would triple the number of BDP MPs 
in Turkey’s General Assembly to 60.  
 Recognizing that there is “a Kurdish issue” and promising to change some of the 
conditions that have given rise to it has been an enormous step forward for the country. The 
AKP initiative, however, has represented an attempt to define this issue on its own terms and 
thus set its own agenda for a solution, primarily not by following the religious line, but 
actually very much like previous Turkish governments did in the 1990s.43 The official AKP 
position, as declared by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, acknowledges the Kurds as a 
distinct ethnicity, but harbors this under the roof of Turkishness. The dual identity concept, an 
overriding Turkish identity (üst kimlik) common to all by virtue of being citizens, and a sub-
identity (alt kimlik) defined by, for example, ethnicity manifestly does assume the nationalist 
narrative. It is clearly a reconceptualization of the republican concept of citizenship, 
supposedly devoid of ethnic reference, that operates as an umbrella for the ethnic diversity of 
the country.44 The dominant AKP view, in fact, ultimately assumes a statist discourse, just 
like the other main parties—that is, as a sine qua non of Turkish politics.45  
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AKP Versus the Kurdish Movement  
The Kurdish initiative has been undertaken with a conscious disregard of the social and 
political presence of the Kurdish movement. It is true that the government faces fierce 
opposition to the idea of negotiation with the PKK, the “code” of staying in power, which has 
meant avoiding conflict with the secular bloc led by the military and the judiciary.46  
 Nevertheless, these considerations are, in our opinion, not sufficient to explain the 
AKP’s approach to the Kurdish question. The party has become so dominant in Turkish 
politics, occupying the vast center ground of moderate religious conservatism and 
commanding such a large parliamentary majority, that it not only had the power to instigate 
an initiative addressing the issue in the Southeast, but also had to go to quite radical lengths to 
solve it. We believe that there are other reasons why the government has lacked incentive, 
which thus provide a fuller explanation of the current approach.  
 There has never been a cooperative relationship between the ruling party and the 
Kurdish movement, irrespective of calls both in Turkey and from the EU for the two to join 
forces in order to advance political change in the country. The reasons for the ongoing distrust 
are various. Of course, the AKP, with many Turkish nationalists among its ranks, has 
difficulties in coming to terms with the Kurdish issue. But on more than one front the AKP 
and the Kurdish movement are also direct competitors. Most obviously, in the Southeast as 
well as in the western metropolises where many Kurds live, they both have sought to obtain 
the votes of the same electorate over the last decade. They have also employed fairly similar 
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means to achieve this, such as the emphasis on local service provisions, and the establishment 
of relationships between politicized civil society associations and party-friendly 
entrepreneurs, on the one hand, and the constituents on the other.  
 Interestingly, both the AKP and the PKK claim to be the architects of Turkish 
democratization and consequently determining the future resolution of the Kurdish question: 
the AKP from Ankara through the Kurdish initiative, the PKK from the Southeast through the 
democratic triangle concept. Neither one would happily tolerate the other’s claim to credit or 
usurpation of authority in democratic improvements. Undoubtedly this constitutes an obstacle 
for any kind of negotiations between these political actors. Although having pushed for 
reforms, the way in which the AKP framed these reforms is complicating its own capability of 
transforming Turkey’s political system. Indeed, the AKP government’s signature is a series of 
reforms. As a result of these reforms, Turkey sufficiently met the Copenhagen Criteria and 
accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU, which had been started in 2005. 
However, facing severe opposition from the radical secular and nationalist camp, the AKP 
defended these reforms mainly in reference to a desired integration of the country into the EU. 
Moreover, the AKP presented itself as the party protecting democracy, and not necessarily as 
the party transforming the political system in the direction of a liberal democracy. In other 
words, the AKP framed its policies in a technocratic way: defending them with reference to 
the European Union, and not based on a deepening of the awareness that the political system 
in Turkey truly needed radical reforms. This is what Çınar calls the “anti-political agenda of 
political reform” of the AKP, as a result of which the party is not able to “pursue consistently 
a reformist agenda” (Çınar 2011: 13, 22).47  
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Crucially important as this struggle for authority between the political actors is in 
terms of practical politics, even more fundamental is the difference in how the two sides wish 
to achieve political change. Both the Kurdish movement and the conservative democrats of 
the AKP seek to transform socio-political life by engaging in the transformation of the 
individual and society. A better society is sought through change at several levels, including 
the most intimate level of the lives of their supporters. However, whereas AKP supporters are 
called upon to meet their individual responsibilities as devout Muslims displaying piety, the 
PKK ultimately seeks change through the personal transformation of its followers into “new 
men” or “new women”—that is, men and women dedicated to the PKK’s “revolution” for 
liberty and socialism, for whom following the PKK’s ideology is considered the means to free 
themselves from their subordinate position.48  
 “Born from the left,” the Kurdish movement has conceived of itself from the outset as 
a modern and revolutionary force for change, intent on doing away with traditional structures 
of socio-political organization.49 The conservative AKP constitutes a threat to this 
transformational project. This goes to the heart of the very real gulf that exists between the 
competing forces, beyond differences of emphasis or orientation, or the power politics of a 
turf war. Very much like the secularist opposition of the CHP to the current trend in Turkey’s 
social and political life, the Kurdish movement as a whole is deeply suspicious of and 
opposed to the basic direction of cultural change in the country, and the socio-political 
direction in which the government is going.  
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Containment Through Counter-Terrorism 
The state institutions, still dominated by hard-line Kemalists—such as public prosecutors, the 
military, and the higher echelons of civilian bureaucracy—continue to perceive the problem 
primarily in terms of “terrorism” and respond by means of “hard politics.”50 Repressive 
measures such as party and association bans and arrests continue to be employed in response 
to what is still regarded as an existential threat to the republic. Just as PKK bases are attacked 
from the air and the ground, so are sympathetic and related organizations hampered, 
restricted, and closed down. This response is essentially an extension of the “oxymoron of a 
military solution.”51 There is a clear continuation here of the establishment’s earlier 
positioning vis-à-vis the political struggle of the Kurdish movement, which relates to the 
“national security syndrome” embedded in the Turkish political system. This leaves the 
political elite conceiving of itself as both guarantor of the country’s national security and 
promoter of liberalization, consequently leading it to undermine democracy in the name of 
security.52 
 According to the simple imperative of fighting terrorism, it is in the interest of all the 
branches and bodies of the state to undermine the strength of the local Kurdish-party-led 
municipalities. This has been visible not only in high-profile judicial decisions, such as the 
DTP ban, but also in local ones, such as the Diyarbakır court decision to ban one of the main 
associations lending support to the poor in the city. This DTP-related poverty-alleviation 
association (Sarmaşık Derneği) was closed down for failing to have the official status of an 
association working for the benefit of public welfare, a decision that affected some 15,000 of 
Diyarbakır’s most needy citizens. This kind of law enforcement does indeed attest efforts on 
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the part of state officials to undermine the functioning of the Kurdish-party-run 
municipalities, especially given the importance of aid programs for the ruling political actors 
to win over the local population.53  
 In respect of the recent arrests, the security analysis has the KCK depicted as a 
modernized urban expression of terrorism, clandestinely spreading fear through the region’s 
local authorities, hospitals, universities, and the like. The arrests have generally been 
portrayed as necessary in the struggle against PKK “terrorism,”54 a policy sustained by the 
governing party, the opposition parties, and the military and judiciary. The main concern is to 
take away the “root causes” of terrorism, but the current containment politics also attest to the 
growing recognition that the PKK insurgency cannot be ended by mere military operations. 
Rather than risking the lives of more Turkish soldiers in the mountainous hinterlands, the aim 
is to roll back the PKK presence in social and political, primarily urban life. However, the 
question is at what price? Efforts to contain the Kurdish movement might ultimately lead to a 
backlash in violence and might have already undermined the Kurdish initiative. This can be 
read from the many criticisms and outward hostility that the containment approach has 
already met with from Kurdish social and political actors, as well as from others in Turkey. 
Most recently, it has merely provided a platform for the linguistic demands of the Kurdish 
movement, with the defendants in the KCK case claiming the right to use Kurdish in their 
trial.  
 
Responses  
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What the government has designated as counter-terrorism operations has figured in the 
Kurdish imagination just as anti-Kurdish operations. Images of handcuffed mayors have 
become iconic in the Kurdish media, triggering indignation and outrage from the DTP and 
PKK supporters and other Kurdish actors. The closure of the DTP and the December arrests 
have quickly been seized on by both the PKK and the DTP/BDP to mobilize the masses and 
increase support. The current repression is depicted as caused by the AKP government. 
Supporters of the Kurdish movement share a deepening sense of hostility towards the ruling 
party and have come to denounce the Kurdish opening (Kürt açılımı) as a Kurd-less opening 
or an opening without Kurds (Kürtsüz açılım). Less radical voices merely state their loss of 
enthusiasm, disappointment, and lack of hope for anything to transpire from the government’s 
initiative at this point.  
 The closure of the DTP in particular deeply dismayed many in the country. Even 
Prime Minister Erdoğan was moved to speak out against it. For their part, the PKK and the 
political party and organizations associated with it have responded to the government and 
state attempts to contain their presence in different ways. In response to the AKP, the PKK 
leadership first pushed forward its own roadmap in an effort to set the conditions for peace 
and to position itself as a principal actor in the solution process. The physical copy of this has 
never seen the light of day, after being “lost” in the corridors of power around the time when 
the AKP launched its Kurdish opening. The next PKK move was to send a group of peace 
negotiators from Northern Iraq to act as go-betweens, presumably with a level of collusion 
from government agencies, a move that offered high hopes for a few days before failing. The 
PKK roadmap has been neglected since that episode. 
 In response to the judiciary’s operations against its organizational bodies, the PKK 
leadership in the mountains has continued to call on young people to join the ranks of the 
guerilla in order to prepare in case of future military operations, and in an attempt to 
29 
 
demonstrate to the Turkish state and military that it is still capable of doing so. The PKK 
retains the threat of renewed violence, should progress continue to be thwarted.55 As for the 
PKK, its holding on to arms is generally conceived as a means to secure its political survival 
as well as that of the political struggle with which it is engaged through the KCK and the 
DTP/BDP. The PKK has, over the past years, never ceased to recruit new Kurdish youth into 
its ranks,56 displaying an ongoing distrust towards the Turkish state apparatus and government 
of the day. The official position maintained by the PKK—namely, a unilateral ceasefire with 
the right to “self-defense” in case of attack—becomes more appealing to young Kurds with 
the crackdown on the legal wing of the movement. 
 
Future Prospects 
Given the deep, established fault lines between the Kurdish movement and the AKP, the 
future promises ongoing political-ideological struggles that are constitutive also of the 
ongoing identity-formation of the followers and converts of the two movements. This 
“battlefield” could remain an ideological and thus non-violent one of political strife and 
conflict, fought within the legitimate arenas of civil society. And it still contains potential for 
a solution as the AKP grows in confidence regarding its own position vis-à-vis the military. 
Indeed, following the confirmation of the Kurdish party’s electoral power with the 
constitutional referendum—and repeated statements throughout from Prime Minister Erdoğan 
and others that the Kurdish problem remains high on the government agenda, even when it 
appears otherwise—the process has once more shown some small signs of life.57 Equally, 
there is plenty of room for radicalization, should the divide between the two sides widen and 
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become increasingly mutually exclusive,58 especially if the AKP fails to take the lead and 
embark on the radical route forward that will be necessary to finally bring the PKK down 
from the mountains and achieve real peace.  
 The ongoing counter-terrorism operations of the state, on the other hand, are far more 
dangerous since they reinforce those voices within the Kurdish movement that would rather 
fight their way out of the ongoing repression against their movement, having lost hope for a 
political solution and believing that a solution can only be found by means of armed struggle. 
This would mean a rise in armed clashes, possibly leading to a renewed period of warfare 
between PKK insurgents and the Turkish Armed Forces, giving rise to increased Turkish and 
Kurdish nationalism and even raising the specter of communal violence between Turks and 
Kurds in the country’s largest cities, which host large numbers of Kurdish migrants and 
internally displaced people. Failure of the government’s initiative will only profit the security 
forces looking for a modus operandi with which to reassert authority in the country. The AKP 
has brought this danger on itself insofar as it has sought to embrace the Kurds and the multi-
cultural reality of the country, while disregarding the societal and political presence of the 
Kurdish movement.   
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who vote for the AKP cannot be Kurds.” 
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